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[Sandra Lean]

I thought it would be best to start a separate thread to discuss this decision, and what it means not only to Simon himself, and to his loved ones, but also to the wider MoJ community.

I know the decision has left many of us numb - it is almost impossible to get your head around such an utterly perverse decision, but when I looked again at the court statement, something jumped right out at me.

"While we have concluded that the fibre evidence given at trial was incomplete in its description and analysis of the available source material, and in its identification of green polyester fibres, wrong, we are quite satisfied that the scientific support for the assertion that the appellant was the source of the fibres found at the crime scene is compelling

How in the name of all that's sane can this be said when there was no source garment belonging to Simon Hall ever discovered?

[nugnug]

to so to some the verdict.

the judges said all though the only evedence in the case has been proven to be bo*****s we are satisfied the conviction is safe.

[admin]

That's pretty much it nugnug as far as I can see. The point Sandra made there about the lack of a source garment is one that she's been making from the very beginning and even from the small amount reported of the judgement so far you can see just how ridiculous it is.

"incomplete in it's description" = "void of the evidence that demonstrated differences"
"available source material" = "a suspected garment which has never been proven to exist"

And although they have accepted that the 'identification' of 'green' polyester fibres was wrong, they seem to be conveniently overlooking the fact that at the original trial the testifying expert stated that it was the presence of more than one type of 'similar' fibre that added strength to her conclusion.

What they have effectively done is accept that the evidence presented in court was wrong before going on to speculate that the expert testifying that the fibres were different would not have influenced the jury had they heard him. It should have been for the jury to decide at the very least and a retrial ordered, anything less is a cover-up.

[nugnug]

its not the buisness of a judge to try and gueus what a jury may have done.

[admin]

This is basically what the appeal courts have today described as "incomplete in it's description" -

Mr Coyle, a forensic fibre expert with 13 years experience, was asked to investigate the case by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC).

"We looked at the original fibres and conducted an independent review," he told the BBC News website.

"We found the flock fibres were not indistinguishable (as the court had been told in the original trial) but were different.

"I was very surprised. I fully expected to be confirming what the Forensic Science Service had done.

"The flock fibres were of a different thickness, and different colour and different number of titanium particles in them."

[nugnug]

i dont see how they can say he would have been found giulty anyway without the fiber evedence as far as i can see the fiber evedence was all the proscution had.

what other evedence could he have been convicted on.

[HaveHope]

I feel absolutely gutted for Simon Hall and everyone who has supported him in his fight to clear his name and this decision today is just mind boggling.  I was convinced Simon would be released today, (the worse scenario being a retrial) and I cant for the life of me figure out how todays decision was reached. 



 

[nugnug]

i ha a feeling the convicton would not be qaushed outright but i thought a retrail would be ordered.

[Toth]

as far as i can see the fiber evidence was all the prosecution had.

The prosecution still has the original fiber evidence.
Just because the later analysis disclosed dissimilarities in the fibers and thus disclosed evidence that is significant to the defense does not mean that such later analysis must be accepted on appeal. Part of the technological review was based on a technique that can give false reports of fiber differences, the appellate court is not required to accept the recent fiber related evidence merely because it is generally reliable since there is a scientifically valid, though unlikely, basis for rejecting it.

[Colin Bowman]

I'm with you on this one Toth, that this is the technical crux of upholding SH's conviction.

Toth, I then wonder whether the respective techniques used by prosecution and defense, are both open to producing "false reports of fiber differences". Where in some manner it is then scientifiically prudent to always apply both techniques (when offering scientific knowledge for use within legal process): the one foregrounding the basis for seeing two samples as in some sense, "the same"; the other foregrounding the basis for seeing two samples as in some sense "different". I don't see how justice is served by science, if we become selective about what part of a relevant science we embrace, and what part of that science we reject. I would argue that in a jury-based legal process, the jury should have access to all of what a science says about an issue, if they are to make the informed judgement on which justice depends.
So science has here a duty to detach itself from the adversarial aspect of prosecuting and defending in legal process.

I think that the ruling is here in technical error, where as someone else has already said: this divergence of expert opinion which is dependent on applied technique, indicates that the case should go for retrial; rather than, as you deftly point out, being arcanely exploited to uphold a conviction.
The argument for retrial, is that it is possible that an origonal jury were obstructed from making an informed judgement on the fibre-evidence provided by experts, because this issue now foregrounded at appeal was not sufficiently clarified at trial.
At such a retrial, the arguments would fulcrum around the significance of applying different scientific techniques. The issue of what this means for scientific knowledge, could be teased out. The issue of how such scientific knowledge (now clarified for the purposes of this case) intersects with relevantly informing a jury about the "facts" of a case (so that they can come to informed-judgement), could be teased out.
Imagine the activity, by scientists and legal-agents (for prosecution and defese), if any retrial were set up on this basis; as something of a test-case. The issue would become: if legal process comes to rely on science, is there then a duty to transparently apply all of that science; so a principle of probity in applying scientific knowledge, that would parallel the principles we already have to regulate disclosure of evidence. So, scientific knowledge or opinion permitted to enter legal process, would have to enter with all the caveats a science might attach to any knowledge or opinion it offers: the introduction of such knowledge and opinion would have to involve the disclosure of a science's own reservations about the finality and certainty of any item of knowledge or opinion it offers.
As things stand, what a science entertains in-house about the certainty and finality of its knowledge, is always in danger of being hidden or lost by the time expert scientific opinion is heard at trial. All such that, in a scientific era where scientific testimony is likely to remain part of things, we need a cultural perspective on scientific testimony, that a jury can use to see their judgements made informed.

colin

[Sandra Lean]

As promised, here is the full decision - I must apologise, I have not had time to read it, as I a currently tied up with other things, but will join the discussion as soon as I am able.

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2011/4.html

[Toth]

I don't see how justice is served by science, if we become selective about what part of a relevant science we embrace, and what part of that science we reject. I would argue that in a jury-based legal process, the jury should have access to all of what a science says about an issue, if they are to make the informed judgement on which justice depends.
So science has here a duty to detach itself from the adversarial aspect of prosecuting and defending in legal process.

The trouble is that rarely are technical experts anything other than advocacy witnesses disguised as "neutral experts". And the totality of a scientific discipline is beyond the ken of an average juror and beyond the interest of the average judge. In the Luke Mitchell case, DNA seems to have been beyond the interest of the defense counsel.

Its like the husband who was told by the private detective: Your wife and that Unknown Male rented adult video tapes then bought a bottle of liquor then went to an adult motel room where there was a mirrored ceiling and a water-bed. They spent several hours there but your wife closed the window curtains so I couldn't see what happened. The husband's response of "You see, there is always that element of doubt" reminds me of the justice's response in this decision. Just what evidence is going to ever be accepted if you set the standards so high? Do you really have to bring in an eye witness? Do you really have to bring in someone with a PhD in the study of sex to know what happened in that motel room? Yet the lawyers job is to throw up barriers and create doubts.

Fiber evidence is misleading due to different perceptions of "match" and "similar". Juries do not understand what is happening and do not have a sufficient attention span to ever understand it. Just because thermometers and rain gauges sometimes give false readings is no reason to reject that its a cold and rainy day.

[nugnug]

it still amzes me how he became a suspect in this case ln the first place.

[Toth]

this divergence of expert opinion which is dependent on applied technique, indicates that the case should go for retrial; rather than, as you deftly point out, being arcanely exploited to uphold a conviction.
...
The issue of what this means for scientific knowledge, could be teased out. The issue of how such scientific knowledge (now clarified for the purposes of this case) intersects with relevantly informing a jury about the "facts" of a case (so that they can come to informed-judgement), could be teased out.

The issue is not the clarification of fiber evidence for the jury. The issue is do we want to let this guy have a new trial. The clarification of technological evidence and its reliability are the excuses used to justify the underlying decision.
Factually its pretty clear. The jury doesn't know much about fiber evidence and gives excessive weight to certain emotionally loaded terminology. Fiber experts really are not experts in many circumstances. New techniques have shown the fibers are not identical but such new techniques CAN be rejected and so WILL be rejected simply because we do not LIKE the implications of accepting that new knowledge. If that means the justices have to sit there and deny what happened on top of that water bed, they will do so. Its simply that the denials will be couched in a manner that is not quite so obviously absurd.

[Toth]

it still amzes me how he became a suspect in this case ln the first place.

Once you are on the police radar, it really doesn't matter how you got there!

One man did hard time because a police file had TWO index cards in it: John M. Smith and John Q. Smith but the cop on duty just picked up the first card he saw. After that, the focus stayed on the unlucky guy.

Cops "clear" cases by focusing on a target and getting a conviction, usually by getting a confession. Such niceities as the interrogation techniques are not relevant. Its not even relevant to ask if the crime actually took place! The goal is to convict a certain suspect of it. That is the 'win'. In many sporting events the goallines are switched at half time. It makes no difference to the players. Its the "win".